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Abstract 
The increase of terrorism and terrorist organizations such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham throughout the Middle East over the past three years have led to an exponential increase 
in individuals living outside of the Middle East becoming radicalized. These individuals range from 
children to adults, both male and female. The current study focuses on the process of deradicalization. 
While a number of studies have begun exploring this issue with regards to the actual process, this 
study focuses on the perceptions of deradicalization from the public. The study is a mixed-method 
design with the quantitative portion being a questionnaire about what the students’ perceptions are 
toward consequences of convicted individuals in relation to extremists. Much research has been done 
on citizens’ perceptions toward convicted criminals in countries such as the US and the current study 
seeks to relate those findings, which suggest that there is a highly negative attitude toward convicted 
criminals, to the attitudes expressed by the university students in Kuwait toward extremists. The 
qualitative portion of the study involved an open-ended prompt which gave the participants the chance 
to discuss and describe their thoughts about whether or not a religious extremist could be rehabilitated 
and deradicalized. The qualitative portion of the study was the primary focus because it is important 
for program and policy developers associated with deradicalization to understand what the general 
public perceives regarding the process. The results for the qualitative portion were divided into two 
main themes: the first being “change is possible” for extremists and the second being “change is not 
possible” for extremists. However, an interesting find was the third theme that emerged from both of 
the first two themes, characterized as “all people should be given a second chance.” The current study 
aims to add to the research gap regarding the public’s perception of deradicalization in the hopes that 
future work will be conducted in this area.   
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Introduction 
 
  The terrorism and humanitarian crisis which dramatically increased in 2014 with the 
rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the continued presence of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria and other terrorist organizations around the world have forced governments 
and citizens to face radicalism in a variety of forms. There have been an especially high 
number of foreign individuals that have traveled to Syria, Iraq, and other countries with the 
intent of joining a particular terrorist organization. Many of the individuals that successfully 
make it to their determined point rarely are able to return to their previous residence. 
However, there are in fact several individuals who do travel back to their homeland or are 
stopped by security forces before being able to carry out their plan in joining the extremist 
group. The essence of both types of individuals, those that make it successfully to their target 
country and those that are stopped beforehand, are parallel in that both individuals have 
become radicalized by one method or another and are intent in carrying out their duties. 
Although there are many researchers and centers focusing on how to prevent this 
radicalization process from happening in the first place, there are fewer focusing on how to 
deradicalize those individuals who are already radicalized. This would be different with the 
two types of individuals listed above because those that come back from their time abroad 
tend to either reenter the country with the intent of committing an act of violence and/or to 
help operations within that country or they were faced with the reality upon arrival to the 
terrorist organization that did not match their preconceived notion of what joining the group 
would be. In this case, their individual ideology was challenged and they believe that they 
have made a mistake.  
 The difference between these two types of individuals is clear, one being still very 
much radicalized and the other actively questioning their ideology that might have led to 
radicalization. The individuals stopped by security before being able to travel are also 
different than the two others just mentioned in that they most likely have not had direct 
contact or actions with terrorist groups and in most cases would not be legally charged to the 
same extent as the other two. The issue that this situation highlights is the possibility that 
several of these individuals could be placed in counseling centers or rehabilitation centers that 
focus on deradicalization and then re-integration into the public. Deradicalization is a 
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relatively new field of research but does have several programs already in place such as 
Germany with regards to Neo-Nazis and other radicals (Dechesne and De Roon, 2013). There 
are also facilities with the same focus in countries throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa, all of which have limited or no long-term data regarding the success rate (Bertram, 
2015). The difference between the Western countries’ programs and the programs in the 
Middle East is that those in the Middle East focus on ideological/theological re-education 
while the programs in the western countries focus on practical and economic assistance and 
social re-integration (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). In fact, deradicalization processes and 
programs as a whole have no real, long-term evidence to base the programs on or support the 
success that they may have (Horgan and Altier, 2012).  
 The current study recognizes that there are many different methods of deradicalization 
being used at the time of writing and together with the increase of global terrorism, the 
academic data regarding this topic will also increase. However, what has not been studied at 
the time of the writing is what happens after deradicalization with regards to the individuals. 
A long-term goal of deradicalization programs is to integrate the individuals back into society 
but simply doing so without taking into consideration public opinion could be a vital error. 
Although there have been several studies focusing on the public’s perception toward terrorism 
since the events of September 11, 2001 (Stevens, et al., 2011; Jore, 2007; Lemyre, Turner, 
Lee, and Krewski, 2006); Goodwin, Willson, and Stanley, 2005) it seems that there is limited 
research on the topic of the public perception of deradicalization, which is essential to 
understand in order to properly reintegrate former radicals into the public. The current study 
seeks to provide a start to this topic of public perception toward deradicalized individuals by 
asking is there an overall negative perspective toward former radicalized religious extremists 
and whether demographics such as gender, nationality, and religion have differences in 
perspectives toward this population. However, before delving into this topic, several 
definitions and theories must be explored.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Kyle Msall: Perceptions of extremists and deradicalization programs among university 
students in Kuwait 
80 
Terrorism, radicalization, deradicalization  
 
The term terrorism has several definitions in accordance with the government body 
defining it. An analysis of the United States’ and Russia’s definitions indicated several 
similarities which include the act or threat of violence, influence the decision of a group, 
intimidation methods, a motive with regards to politics, religion, or economics, and violence 
that is directed against civilians (Kuznetcov and Kuznetcov, 2013). This is widely used as the 
definition of terrorism and without question lists many elements of terrorism. Some 
definitions of modern terrorism include the term “non-state actors” and define terrorism as the 
initiator or violence not only directed toward civilians as the previous definition implies, but 
also against material or symbolic representations (Lizardo, 2015).  
An example of terrorism against symbolic representations could be seen as recent as 
ISIS’ attempt to destroy cultural symbols throughout Iraq and Syria. During 2014 – 2016, 
ISIS waged not only a terrorist war on civilians and governments, but also on cultural heritage 
sites throughout the Middle East. These sites included the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites such as Palmyra and 
other cultural heritage sites including holy sites and temples of the Yezidis, Christians, and 
Shi’a. This destruction of cultural and religious sites is often displayed on social media by 
ISIS in order to promote terror and to recruit. Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, and Jackson (2015) 
posited that this type of terrorism is labeled “socially mediated terrorism” which is a new 
form of terrorism brought on by the rise of social media. They go on to point out that ISIS 
used religion to justify the destruction of antiquities and to promote their view of Islam 
(Smith, et al., 2015). Although ISIS is one of the most recent terrorist organizations to deploy 
social media tactics, there have been other terrorist organizations in the past that have gone to 
the media to promote their cultural destructions as well. As an example, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001 because they believed that Islam 
declared all other religious statues and sites as false idols and publicly took to media to 
promote their endeavors (Colwell-Chanthaphonh, 2003).  
 Although there are set definitions of terrorism used universally by governments and 
organizations, the rise of social media and technology are enabling terrorist groups to use 
different and unique tactics that have not been used or seen in the past. It suggests that as 
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technology improves and becomes more intertwined in everyday life, the definition of 
terrorism should be altered in order to take on the totality of what is available and utilized by 
terrorist organizations. The rise of social media and technology is also increasing the 
recruiting and radicalization process of terrorist organizations.  
 A definition for radicalization is harder to come by and is not as universal as the 
definition of terrorism above. According to Ahmed (2016), radicalization is “characterized by 
the adoption of an explicit ideological system that encourages radicalization and promotes the 
use of violence by individuals or groups in pursuance of political, ideological, or religious 
objectives” (p. 234). This definition and the definition of terrorism share similar terms and 
ideas including the overall theme of using violence for a political, ideological, or religious 
objective. Other definitions include factors that may lead to radicalization such as the 
definition posited by Bartlett, Birdwell, & King (2010). These factors were divided into three 
different levels which were global, state, and social-policy. The authors agreed that there is no 
concrete definition of radicalization but believe that the radicalization occurs across the 
aforementioned levels and when individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message 
and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward 
extreme views (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010). This differs from the definition proposed 
by Ahmed (2016) in that there is no reference to violence (i.e. terrorism) associated with 
radicalism. This is further supported by Al-Badayneh’s (2010) statement that the relationship 
between the two, radicalization and terrorism, is not causal and further noted that 
radicalization could lead to terrorism, as suggested by several other studies (Al-Badayneh, 
Khelifa, and Alhasan, 2016; Doosje, et al., 2016; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). Based 
on the above definitions, it is quite clear that there is not a concrete, universally accepted 
definition of the process of radicalization because the term is used in several different 
contexts such as the security, integration, and foreign-policy contexts which all carry different 
meanings (Sedgwick, 2010).  
 However, several models of radicalization have confirmed that social-psychological 
factors do play significant roles in the process of radicalization (Ahmed, 2016; Doosje, et al., 
2016). The psychological components of radicalization are discussed in Hafez and Mullins 
(2015) and highlight two important features of radicalization: the cognitive and behavioral 
dimensions. This is parallel to the above statement that radicalization could lead to terrorism 
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and also the definition of radicalization which postulated that a main goal of radicalization 
was to promote violence as an objective. It does not seem likely that an individual would 
become a behavioral radical (i.e. committing or physically supporting violent acts for a 
purpose of terrorism) before becoming cognitively radicalized. This coincides with the eight 
radicalization models compared and discussed by Christmann (2012). All of the models 
discussed by Christmann (2012) differed in the steps and/or stages of how radicalization 
occurs but the models did agree that a change within the individual does occur at some point 
during the radicalization process. There were some missing key points in the models, 
however, which included a timeline of the process and what exactly initiates an individual to 
begin the process in the first place. This leads to the important question of deradicalization 
research: can an individual who is cognitively radicalized be deradicalized before becoming 
behaviorally radicalized and committing violent acts? This is one of the fundamental 
questions researchers have within the deradicalization field of study.  
 Since radicalization does not have a universal definition and there are several different 
models and theories as to how the process or system of radicalization occurs, it should be no 
surprise that deradicalization also has no universal definition. This is partly because there is 
little research on deradicalization as it pertains to religious extremism (as opposed to 
deradicalization in other contexts such as Neo-Nazism) and with Islamic extremists in 
particular. The concept of deradicalization also lacks the precision that radicalization has and 
is often addressed as a disruption of radicalization in lieu of reversing the process of 
radicalization (Della Porta and LaFree, 2012). It is understandable why security agencies tend 
to focus on disrupting radicalization in the short term but focusing on actually reversing the 
radicalization process in long term may improve the individual’s chance to stay non-
radicalized and help others to do the same.  
According to Ashour (2007), deradicalization is similar to that of radicalization in the 
sense that a change takes place within the individual or group. Ashour (2007) stated that 
deradicalization is a process within the individual or a group that seeks to reverse its radical 
ideology and de-legitimize the use of violent acts to achieve the objectives of terrorist groups. 
Ashour (2007) also conjectured that those individuals or groups who deradicalize also start to 
accept the social, political, and economic changes within the society. Horgan and Braddock 
(2010) offer another definition of deradicalization which suggested it is the “social and 
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psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent 
radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and 
engagement in violent activity” (p. 280).  This definition integrates the psychological factors 
that were also discussed in Hafez and Mullins’ (2015) definition of radicalization.  
The increase in ‘home grown terrorism’ around Europe and North America has led to 
several organizations and governments to begin developing and implementing counter violent 
extremism (CVE) programs. These are programs that rely on the community and the public 
for support in identifying and reporting individuals that may be of concern. These programs 
were based on evidence that friends of the individuals contemplating carrying out acts of 
extreme terrorism could be the best poised to notice these changes (Williams, Horgan, & 
Evans, 2016; Williams, Horgan, & Evans, 2015). This seems like it would be successful, 
however, a drawback that both studies revealed was the “reluctant bias” which means the 
individuals do not report due to the fear that it would damage their relationship with their 
friend or the fear of actual reporting. William et al. (2016) state that because of this bias, 
when an individual comes forward with information about an individual considering such 
violence, they should be taken seriously due to the internal struggle the individual had to 
overcome and the possible consequences. By obtaining these individuals in the possible early 
stages of radicalization, one can suggest that the process of deradicalization could be 
implemented successfully.  
 The rise in foreign fighters from Europe to Syria to join ISIS has also increased the 
return of these fighters back into their countries of origin in Europe. This has led to several 
questions as presented by Dechesne and De Roon (2013) which address the challenges of how 
the returning fighters should be dealt with, what is the nature of the threat, and the best 
practices of dealing with those radicalized individuals. In their article, the authors believe that 
deradicalization is more than an ideological debate and should discuss the psychology of the 
process of radicalization and what can be done to reverse it. Again, the topic of 
deradicalization is heavily reliant on the unclear definition of radicalization and the process of 
radicalization. What most studies focusing on deradicalization exclude from their analysis and 
suggestions is the general public’s acceptability and perspective of reintegrating former 
radicals and the process of deradicalization as a whole. Similar to the CVE programs 
mentioned above, perhaps a correct path would be to incorporate the community within 
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deradicalization programs. In fact, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) and Horgan et al., (2016) posited 
that several case studies have revealed that increased contact with the community outside of 
the extremist environment is an accelerator of the exit process. This further relates to an idea 
within criminology which is tertiary desistance. Tertiary desistance is a concept developed 
and discussed by McNeil and Schinkel (2016) that iterates the importance of a positive 
community experience for ex-offenders. The authors stated that the more an individual has a 
sense of belonging to a positive community, the more desistance that individual will have 
from the negative attitudes and behaviors. This could certainly be linked to the process of 
deradicalization in a sense that the complete process will also take into account the re-
integration of the individual into the community. As aforementioned, if the re-integration 
efforts stall or the community is not able to comply with the re-integration of a former radical 
or extremist, the individual may relapse into the radicalized and extremist way of thinking. 
This study aims to add literature to this gap in academia to bring some insight as to what 
possible perspectives can be expected.  
 
Perspectives toward ex-offenders 
 
 Before discussing the study itself, a brief discussion on the public’s perspective toward 
ex-offenders might draw some insight as to how the public might perceive a former religious 
radical or extremist. There has been much research on this topic in western countries and it 
seems there is an overall negative public attitude toward these ex-offenders which prove to be 
a barrier to successful reentry of the ex-offenders into society (Wakefield and Uggen, 2010). 
Further, a study conducted about perspectives toward returning offenders found that 
participants largely agreed that the community support for the offenders was mostly 
unreliable and often nonexistent (Brooks, Visher, and Nasser, 2006). Although extremists and 
terrorists are often considered a different type of criminal, and in some instances convicted in 
military courts instead of civil courts, the research on ex-offenders could show what the 
perception toward extremists may be. It is important to separate offenders who are religious 
extremists from other offenders because previous research focused on attitudes towards sex 
offenders compared to non-sex offenders showed significantly more negative attitudes toward 
sex offenders (Rade, Desmarais, and Mitchell, 2010). Being that most of the research 
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conducted on perceptions toward ex-offenders has found that there is a negative attitude 
toward these individuals and a significant increase of negative attitudes toward sex offenders, 
it might be that the public’s negative perception of extremism and terrorism would result in an 
increase in negative attitudes toward former extremists as opposed to other ex-offenders. To 
date, there were not any studies found correlating or comparing attitudes toward former 
extremists/terrorists with attitudes toward ex-offenders so no concrete evidence can be 
presented. Again, the goal of the study is to gain an understanding of the perceptions and 
attitudes toward possible former extremists and deradicalized individuals among the public.  
 
Methodology 
 
Participants  
 The participants for this study were undergraduate university students enrolled in the 
American University of Kuwait located in Salmiya, Kuwait. The initial analysis conducted 
with the G*Power software recommended a total of 172 participants in order to obtain an 
optimal sample size for certain statistical tests. A total of 176 participants responded to the 
questionnaire. The age of the participants varied and was classified into four groups: 18-20, 
21-27, 28-35 and 36 and over with the majority of the participants self-identifying in the 18-
20 age group. Further, there were 97 female participants and 79 male participants with 109 
participants claiming Kuwaiti as their nationality and 67 claiming other nationality. The 
overall majority, 157, of the participants claimed Islam as their religion and 19 marked other 
in the demographic field. All participants were first year students and were proficient in the 
English language, as it is a requirement for enrollment at the American University of Kuwait.  
Table 1 
Demographics of Participants 
 Gender Religion Nationality Age 
 Male Female Islam Other Kuwaiti Other ≤ 20 21-27 28-35 36≥ 
Participants  79 97 157 19 109 67 136 35 4 1 
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Materials and Data Processing 
 A survey was developed by the researcher based on several different studies. The first 
half of the questionnaire was developed with the help of the ISSP Module 2014 Citizenship II 
questionnaire by Pammet, et al. (2014). This was used to develop survey questions focusing 
on good citizenship and perspectives on different freedoms in order to develop an 
understanding of the participants’ perspective. The second portion of the questionnaire was 
created on the basis of the ISSP questionnaire but went more into the perspectives of “not 
good” citizens i.e. those who break the law. The questions started by focusing on citizens 
breaking the law in a general sense and then moving toward violent offenders and then finally 
to religious extremists. The analysis was conducted on the SPSS software package (23rd 
Version). All survey questions were arrayed on a five-point Likert scale with 1 being 
“Strongly Disagree” and 5 being “Strongly Agree.” The questionnaire data was input into 
SPSS and statistical analysis was conducted. The t-test was conducted on a number of 
different variables within the study such as gender, religion, and nationality with regards to 
their scores on the survey. In addition to the quantitative portion of the study, an open-ended 
question was included at the end of the questionnaire in order to capture the participants’ 
thoughts regarding deradicalization and rehabilitation for religious extremists. The qualitative 
portion is given the most attention in this particular study. This portion, like the questionnaire, 
was optional for the participants and approximately half of the participants responded to the 
open-ended question. 
 
Procedure 
  Undergraduate students at the American University of Kuwait were asked to complete 
the questionnaire at the end of class time. All surveys were given out midway through the 
2016 fall semester. All students were ensured that the questionnaire was anonymous and that 
their answers would not be linked back to them. The participants were also instructed that 
completing the questionnaire was completely voluntary and they could stop at any point 
throughout the survey. All students provided verbal consent and acknowledged that they 
understood the process and their rights.  
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Results 
 
Quantitative Findings 
The results of the 176 surveys were input into SPSS and statistical tests were 
conducted. The t-test was used on the variables that corresponded to the research questions 
which included: (1) is there a negative perception to former radicals among university 
students in Kuwait and (2) do the demographics of gender, religion, and nationality have a 
difference in perspective toward this population. The two tests conducted on the religion 
(Islam vs. other) variable as well as the nationality (Kuwaiti vs. non-Kuwaiti) variable showed 
no significant differences on the survey questions. 
 This first find is important because it demonstrated that regardless of the participants’ 
religion, the perspectives toward extremists were essentially the same. The group of questions 
on the survey which focused on reformed extremists and prisoners was the last section and 
included the variables as listed below in Table 2.  
 
Table 1 
Questions Focusing on Reformed Prisoners/Extremists 
I would…  
Q19 Feel comfortable living next to a reformed prisoner 
Q20 Feel safe living next to a reformed violent offender 
Q21 Feel safe living next to a reformed religious extremist 
Q22 Feel safe living next to a non-violent religious extremist 
Q23 Feel safe living next to a person wanting to join a terrorist organization 
 
As previously mentioned, a Likert-scale was used on the survey and the max score a 
participant could choose was a 5 for “Strongly Agree” with the max on this section being 25. 
There was no significant difference in the scores between participants who reported Islam as 
their religion (M = 12.47, SD = 3.408) and those participants who marked other as their 
religion (M = 12.21, SD = 3.614), t(174) = .743, p = .755. Although results which show no 
significant difference are usually not focused on in studies, this particular result is important 
for the field of deradicalization and for western society that sometimes pushes the notion that 
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Muslims tend to be more sympathetic to extremists, while this study suggests that is not the 
case. The t-test conducted for the nationality group also showed no significant difference 
between the results.  
 Whereas no scores across the survey showed a significant difference with regards to 
nationality and religion, the results for the gender showed two significant differences. There 
were two variables in the same section, as shown in Table 2 above, where the gender of the 
participants showed a significant difference which included Question 19 and Question 20. For 
Question 19, the results showed a statistically significant difference between the male 
participants (M = 3.01) and the female participants (M = 2.65), t(174) = 2.34, p = .021. For 
question 20, the results also showed a statistically significant difference between the male 
participants (M = 2.68) and the female participants (M = 2.29), t(174) = 2.63, p = .009. The 
male participants overall scored higher on both questions than did the female participants. 
What is interesting about this that more females marked that they strongly disagreed with the 
statements on both Q19 and Q20, with about 50% more marking Strongly Disagree on Q20 
than Q19. This is perhaps because of the term “violent” is included in Q20 and not in Q19, 
signifying that there is a keen difference between what the female participants perceived 
toward reformed prisoners, which is similar to what has been found in previous research.  
There was no significant different between genders in the three following questions 
which were all focused on religious extremists, as was expected. For Q21, the majority of the 
participants’ marks were evenly spread out from “Strongly Agree” to “Agree” while the vast 
majority (153) marked either “Strongly Agree” or “Disagree” on Q23. These questions do 
have very different meanings and while Q21 stressed that the extremist was reformed, 
participants were still unsure about feeling safe living next to these individuals. On the other 
hand, the outcome that most participants would not feel comfortable living next to a person 
wanting to join a terrorist organization is not surprising.  
This leads to the question of what exactly is meant by rehabilitation of terrorists and 
deradicalization. If by comparing the results of previous research, where it was found that the 
public holds a negative view of former offenders (Wakefield and Uggen, 2010), with the 
results of the current study, the study suggests that the public holds similar perspectives of 
reformed radicals/extremists as they do reformed offenders. However, more research in other 
contexts needs to be conducted to strongly suggest that this is the case. Even when an 
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individual goes through programs that are supposed to deradicalize him or her, once out of the 
system, they will possibly face discrimination and negative emotions and perceptions from the 
public. This could propel them back into extremism similarly to some former offenders 
reverting back to committing offences.  
 
Qualitative Findings 
 An open-ended question was included on the questionnaire for the participants to 
voluntarily complete. The question was intended to gain some insight on the participants’ 
individual perspectives about whether or not they believed that a religious extremist could be 
rehabilitated. The results provided an interesting look at the participants’ opinions regarding 
this subject and were analyzed using a thematic analysis as described by Creswell (2013) and 
Braun and Clarke (2006). The responses were diverse with several key themes being 
consistent throughout the responses. The themes are represented below and specific responses 
are included in each theme in order to provide a basis on which these themes were identified. 
This method of analysis has many advantages including the ability for the results to be more 
understandable and relatable to the general public.  For the current study and the general area 
of deradicalization, it is pertinent for the public to be able to read and perhaps even relate to 
the findings in such studies. The most prominent themes which emerged throughout the 
qualitative analysis included Theme 1: Change is possible, Theme 2: Change is not possible, 
and Theme 3: People deserve a second chance. The first two themes found in the analysis 
were expected as the prompt for this portion asked what the participants’ thoughts were 
regarding deradicalization.  
 The first theme had the largest number of references throughout the participants’ 
feedback. There were many different variations and descriptions within this category with 
most participants mentioning that religious radicals could be deradicalized or rehabilitated 
“only if they want to be” and removed from their “toxic environment.” Interestingly, the later 
finding is parallel to the suggestion by Dalgaard-Nielson (2013) and Horgan et al. (2016) that 
contact with the community outside their extremist (or toxic) environment is an accelerator of 
the exit process. Both responses within this theme are similar to each other in that they are 
related to what other rehabilitation processes include. When comparing the participants’ 
feedback to aspects of drug rehabilitation, similarities are noticed because rehabilitation for 
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drug abusers include both that the individual must have the desire to change (which is evident 
in psychology) and they must be removed from their environment which often leads to 
individuals not being able to quit. However, making the comparison between the 
deradicalization process of religious radicals and drug rehabilitation should not be taken fully 
because one is an addiction and the other is an ideology. The environmental stance that the 
participants brought up could also be argued against due to the numerous individuals in these 
“toxic environments” who do not turn to radicalism or extremism. Further, if compared to the 
American prison system in which prisoners are often taken from their environment and put 
into a prison facility, there are frequently sub-groups within these systems that form and 
continue the same environmental issues for the prisoners that they faced in their normal 
environment. Rehabilitation centers that put extremists together could see similar issues and 
some cases such as organized hunger strikes have actually been documented in terrorist 
holding facilities such as Guantanamo (Morse, 2016).  
 The other phrase that was mentioned substantially within Theme 1 was that the 
extremists could only “change if they wanted” to change. This is deemed true of any 
rehabilitation program since the sole determinant of the rehabilitation is the individual who is 
changing. One participant described the change of extremists as a possibility but only with 
help from qualified people who are able to “bring the balance to them” and help “alleviate the 
hate in their heart.” Another participant posited that an extremist individual would have to 
work with a religious leader in order to get a “proper understanding of what their religion 
means/stands for.” Both statements lean toward the same principle of having qualified 
individuals lead and work with individuals throughout the process of deradicalization.  
However, the statements also bring up an important question regarding the process of 
deradicalization: who should lead and work with the individuals being 
deradicalized/rehabilitated? The question is important for two reasons with the first focusing 
on the goals of the deradicalization programs. The goal of these programs are similar, of 
course, but to what extent? For example, the deradicalization/rehabilitation programs 
throughout the Middle East focus on religious leaders and teachings while the programs in the 
western countries tend to focus on clinical methodologies (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Koehler, 
2016). Because the field of deradicalization is relatively new and the research within the field 
does have gaps due to the novelty of the field, apart from the above mentioned works, 
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relatively few studies have compared and contrasted the differences between the two types of 
programs, making this topic excellent for future studies.  
 The second theme also had a large number of participants’ statements within it which 
stated that rehabilitation/deradicalization was not possible among religious 
radicals/extremists. One of the most mentioned ideas within this theme referred to the 
individuals as “brain washed.” This was the leading reason given by participants regarding the 
inability of extremists to be rehabilitated. Being that the majority of the participants identified 
as followers of Islam, it was interesting to recognize that this was a popular answer among the 
participants because it signified that many of the participants perceive the radical views of 
individuals as a phenomenon outside their reality. A similarity between this theme and the 
first theme discussed above was included during the participants’ explanation and description 
of radicals and extremists being “brain washed.” The similar context brought up was the idea 
of the extremists being in a “toxic environment” with most participants in the second main 
theme stating that extremists cannot be rehabilitated because of the toxic environment the 
extremist individuals are encompassed. One participant suggested that even if the individuals 
were taken out of this environment they had been “surrounded by the toxic environment for so 
long that the brain washed person would not be possible to change.” 
 Here we have two similarities between two themes; however, the similarity has 
actually introduced a major difference between the themes. The link between the two themes 
in this case was the shared thought among the majority of the participants that the extremist 
individuals were a part of a toxic environment. The difference between the two themes was 
that the first theme believed that the individual could be rehabilitated if removed from the 
environment which pressures radical and extremist views on them. In contrast, the second 
theme believed that even if the individual were to be removed from his/her environment, 
rehabilitation would not be possible because of the cognitive change that the individual has 
experienced. It would seem that if the rehabilitation center used for deradicalization had 
former religious extremists together there would still be a community and environment within 
the center that all hold similar radical beliefs, possibly allowing for a toxic environment for 
the individuals within the center. It is different than a prison system where the individuals 
held together have different beliefs, ideologies, and values even though they may have 
committed similar crimes.  
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 The third theme that emerged from the analysis was that people deserve a second 
chance. This was found throughout the answers of the participants. However, different 
rationales and contexts were given when participants described this. Just as the first two 
themes were two opposing views, the third theme itself was essentially split into two views. 
Participants often reported that people in general deserve a second chance but, as one 
participant stated, individuals who “killed or help with killing” should not be given another 
chance. This was similar to most of the participants’ statements who believed that everyone 
deserved a second chance. In contrast, there were participants who described the second 
chance as a human right and believed that “effort should be given to help” the individual 
through the process of deradicalization. This is an interesting split in perspectives and it seems 
to closely resemble the different perspectives of the public regarding individuals who commit 
serious crimes. In some western judicial systems, the individuals who commit serious crimes, 
regardless if it was clearly evident or not, can be given a second chance in the form of 
rehabilitation and extensive mental health treatment if the individual was found to have major 
mental health issues that may have led to the crime. A recent example of this situation was 
carried out in Canada (Larkins, 2017). When a case like this presents itself, there is much 
debate about whether the individual should be released or imprisoned. In relation to 
deradicalization, similar debates and difference in opinion/perspectives would also occur 
among the public. The difference, however, would be that those individuals who go through a 
deradicalization program would presumably not have committed crimes involving terrorist 
acts.  
 For all three themes presented throughout the qualitative findings, there was some 
doubt about the ability to rehabilitate and deradicalize at least some of the individuals. A 
special program attached to the deradicalization program could be helpful to bring the 
community behind the programs and perhaps decrease the negative perceptions toward these 
individuals. Rade et al. (2016) found that individuals who reported having some kind of 
contact with ex-offenders actually showed less negative attitudes toward the ex-offenders than 
individuals who had not had any contact with them. Rade et al. (2016) went on further to 
mention that there have not been any contact-based programs for the public in order to reduce 
the negative views toward ex-offenders. A contact-based program for individuals who have 
gone through the deradicalization process and are ready to be integrated into the community 
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may serve both parties equally by lessening the negative notions toward the former radical 
individuals and to increase community support.  
 
Limitations 
 
The current study has a few limitations with regards to the application of the findings. 
Being that the participants all lived and studied in Kuwait at the time, the responses on both 
the quantitative and qualitative portions of the study may be limited to location and should not 
be generalized to other regions and populations. The participants’ answers were all based on 
their own experiences and because Kuwait has a lower risk of terrorism inside the country 
compared to its neighbors, the impacts of terrorism and extremism may not be as direct for the 
participants as it would be in populations in other regions that face the effects of terrorism and 
extremism often. The participants being university students also presented a limitation for the 
study which is often the case for studies done with convenience sampling. Because it is not a 
representation of the general population in Kuwait, the results should not be generalized. 
Future studies focusing on this topic within Kuwait may want to include a random sampling 
of the Kuwaiti population which would increase external validity. This would also allow for 
more diverse participants and could include participants who were in Kuwait during the Iraqi 
occupation. The latter group mentioned may have different perspectives on the 
deradicalization process and the reintegration of those individuals. Another limitation of the 
study is the measurement bias of the participants which is when the participants may answer 
reluctantly or untruthfully due to socially unacceptable answers. Although Kuwait is 
relatively progressive within the GCC, there are subjects and topics that are not discussed in 
public. Some participants may have felt that their answers could be linked to them and 
therefore altered their answers from their initial thought. To decrease the effect of 
measurement bias, all questionnaires and answers were anonymous.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The current study aimed to understand the perspectives of the public toward 
deradicalization and toward the individuals who would potentially go through a program of 
this sort. The findings revealed that the attitudes toward radicals and extremists are similar to 
those attitudes toward convicted criminals and ex-offenders found in previous studies. 
However, the qualitative portion of the study showed that the participants were divided on 
whether a religious extremist/radical could and/or should be deradicalized. As mentioned 
above, the first two themes demonstrated this divide with nearly half the participants 
believing that religious extremists could be deradicalized and the other half believing 
opposite. The third theme, however, revealed that regardless of the participants’ belief on the 
first two themes, a majority of the participants believed that the individuals should be given a 
second chance because everyone should be given another chance, unless those individuals 
either carried out a violent crime or helped with the crime.  
 Just as previous studies on ex-offenders have shown, the findings suggest that there is 
in fact a negative perspective toward former religious extremists. This is important to consider 
when developing a deradicalization program because a key part of these programs is the re-
integration stage. If the public’s perception is negative, it could lead to a discriminatory 
environment being created that might lead the deradicalized individuals into taking refuge 
with the same individuals and organizations that may have led to their radicalization initially. 
This would start the radicalization process all over and would essentially lead to what could 
be called a relapse into extremism. Rade et al.’s (2016) finding that the public’s negative 
perception toward ex-offenders decreased with community contact seems to be a reasonable 
step forward in the future of deradicalization research. Along with research exploring the 
process and programs within this field, considerable research should be done within the re-
integration of extremists into the public. As proposed by Rade et al. (2016) and applied to the 
deradicalization field, the types of future research could address the influence of social 
contact on attitudes toward extremists and consider the type and quality of contact.     
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